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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
sible appeal.92 Failure to utilize the informal procedure is not a waiver
of the right to a formal ruling.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Court of Appeals affirms that prior judgment
establishing freedom from negligence does not establish freedom from
contributory negligence.
In Nesbitt v. Nimmich,93 the Court of Appeals recently affirmed
without opinion an Appellate Division, Second Department, decision
which held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not operate
to establish the plaintiffs freedom from contributory negligence where
his freedom from negligence as a defendant was determined in a
prior action. The case involved a personal injury action between
parties who were co-defendants in the prior suit. The Second Depart-
ment's refusal to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
was based on the difference in the burden of proof accompanying
the movant's change in status from defendant to plaintiff. The plain-
tiff's inability to establish the defendant's negligence in the prior
action should not permit the inference that the defendant can over-
come his burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence in
a subsequent action in which he is the plaintiff.
ARTicLE 71- REcoVERY OF CHAT L
CPLR 7102: Due process protects all types of property.
Since the 1969 Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,94 there have been important developments in replevin
law. In Sniadach, the Court set the direction by declaring that a hear-
ing or an opportunity to defend a replevin action before the garnish-
ment of one's salary was necessary to satisfy the requirements of due
process. While Sniadach was concerned with wages, a "specialized type
of property"9 5 the deprivation of which may cause great personal
92 7B McKINNEYS CPLR 3124, commentary at 630 (1970), citing Tri-State Pipe Lines
Corp. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 285, 273 N.Y.S.2d 976 (lst Dep't 1966), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 128, 142 (1967).
93 80 N.Y.2d 622, 282 N.E.2d 328, 331 N.YS.2d 438 (1972), aff'g mem. 34 App. Div. "2d
958, 812 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JoIN's L. REv. 500, 521 (1971).
94895 U.S. 387 (1969). For extended discussion of Sniadach, see Note, Provisional
Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Con-
stitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBnAN~Y L. Rv. 426, 438 (1970); Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLUas. L. Rxv. 942 (1970); The Quarterly Survey, 46
ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 355, 879 (1971).
95 895 U.S. at 340.
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hardship, the constitutional protection afforded therein was soon held
to extend 6 to other types of "specialized property." In Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co.,97 a three-judge federal court for New York's
Northern District deemed household necessities "specialized property",
and declared New York's replevin statute, article 71 of the CPLR,
to be unconstitutionally broad.98
To meet the Laprease constitutional objections, CPLR 7102 was
amended99 to provide that an order of seizure may be issued by the
court "[u]pon presentation of [an] affidavit and undertaking and upon
such terms as may be required to conform to the due process of law
requirements of the fourteenth amendment... ."100 This amendment,
although enacted with reservations, 101 withstood constitutional attack
in General Electric Credit Corp. v. Fred Pistone, Jr., Inc.'0 2
The continuing difficulty in determining what constitutes "spe-
cialized property" presented itself in clear context in Cedar Rapids
Engineering Co. v. Haenelt10 3 The defendant therein operated a busi-
ness for which he had purchased certain machinery and tools from
the plaintiff. As payment the defendant delivered two promissory notes
to be paid in installments and signed security agreements containing
acceleration clauses in case of default. Title to the chattels was to
remain in the plaintiff until the balance of the debt was paid. Claim-
ing a default, the plaintiff obtained a replevin order dispensing with
notice on the basis of an affidavit that the merchandise was small
and easily removable. Thereupon the sheriff seized the property. The
Supreme Court, Sullivan County, applying the specialized property
concept of Sniadach and Laprease, vacated the order as a violation of
due process. The court reasoned that
96 See The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 768, 794 et seq. (1972).
97 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
98 Id. at 722-28. CPLR 7102 and 7110 were held unconstitutional.
99 L. 1971, ch. 1051, § 1, eff. July 2, 1971.
100 CPLR 7102(d)(1).
101 Upon signing the bill, Governor Rockefeller stated:
I am 'approving this measure at this time, because failure to do would leave
the State without any effective replevin procedure. I am constrained to note,
nevertheless, that there are serious deficiencies in the bill in its present form
that require further consideration. The most troublesome problem is the failure
to establish clear and easily usable standards to guide attorneys and the courts in
taking action under the statute. This is a clear invitation to unnecessary litigation.
2 McKINNEY's SESSION LAWS oF NEW YORK 2641 (1971). See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7102,
supp. commentary at 125 (1971); 7A WK&M 7102.14.
10268 Misc. 2d 475, 326 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JonN's L. Rav. 768, 793 (1972).
103 68 Misc. 2d 206, 826 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971), aff'd, 89 App. Div.
2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972). The lower court decision is discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoiN's L. R y. 768, 794 (1972).
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[t]he deprivation of any tools and equipment tends in obvious
ways to limit the party's ability to earn a living; imposes tremen-
dous hardship on the defendant; and gives the plaintiff unwar-
ranted leverage. The chattels seized by the plaintiff from the
defendant herein were special property.1 °4
Subsequent to this decision but prior to its affirmance, 105 the
United States Supreme Court decided Fuentes v. Shevin.10° Invalidat-
ing the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania,
the Court struck down the troublesome property classifications: "The
Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. . . . It is not
the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to . . protect
only the ones that, by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "107 The Court
recognized that "extraordinary situations" might justify outright sei-
zure, but cautioned that these "must be truly unusual." 108 This warn-
ing was strictly adhered to in the Cedar Rapids affirmance, in which
the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the case did not
fall within the Fuentes exception.
Justice Stewart stated for the majority in Fuentes that the Snia-
dach holding should not be read as placing a limitation on procedural
due process, but rather as emphasizing the special importance of the
property involved therein, i.e., wages.1 9 It is now clear that the type
of property sought to be replevied is irrelevant, and that due process
will afford the litigant an opportunity to present a defense before
the seizure, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
ARTn=CLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Separability of the arbitration provision - time to recon-
cile New York and federal approaches.
When a party alleges fraudulent inducement of a contract con-
taining an arbitration provision, the issue arises as to whether a court
of law or the arbitrator is to pass upon the question of fraud. If the
arbitration provision is viewed as separable from the underlying con-
tract, there is no logical difficulty in permitting the arbitrator to deter-
mine whether the contract has been fraudulently induced, since the
104 68 Misc. 2d at 210, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
105 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 383 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972).
106 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3).
107 Id. at 90. The Court noted that summary seizure of property has been allowed to
collect federal taxes, to further a national war effort, to counteract the effects of a bank
failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food. Id.
at 91-92.
108 Id. at 90.
109 Id. at 89.
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